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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how increasing information sharing bureaus affect 
financial access. For this reason, we have employed contemporary and non-contemporary 
interactive Quantile Regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. Information 
sharing bureaus are proxied with public credit registries and private credit offices. Financial 
development dynamics involving depth (at overall economic and financial system levels), 
efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking and financial system 
perspectives) and size are used. Two key  findings are established. First, the effect of increasing 
private credit bureaus is not clearly noticeable on financial access, probably because private 
credit agencies are still to be established in many countries. Second, increasing public credit 
registries improves financial allocation efficiency and activity (or credit) between the 25
th
 and 
75
th
 quartiles for the most part. As a main policy implication, countries in the top (or highest 
levels of financial development) and bottom (or lowest levels of financial development) ends of 
the financial efficiency and activity distributions are unlikely to benefit from enhanced financial 
allocation efficiency owing to increasing public credit registries. 
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to assess how increasing information sharing offices affects financial 
access when existing levels of financial development are taken into account. Consistent with 
recent literature, less than 20 percent of African households have access to financial services (see 
IFAD, 2011; Asongu et al., 2017). According to the narrative, a great part of the population on 
the continent depends on the informal sector for financial services. Some factors limiting access 
to finance include: low population densities in many areas, poor facilities in transport and limited 
communication infrastructure. In regions where financial services from the formal sector are 
available, low-income households and small businesses are for the most part unable to meet 
some basic lending requirements like strict documentation and collateral provision. Even in 
situations where such conditions are met, cost barriers (like substantial transactions fees) and 
high minimum deposit of savings could still overwhelmingly restrict financial access.  
The above concerns have led to issues of surplus liquidity or excess cash in African 
formal financial institutions (see Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014a, p.70). The 
authors have suggested measures to curb both the voluntary and involuntary holding of excess 
liquidity by banks. First, voluntary holding of excess cash can be reduced by: (i) helping banks 
to track their positions at the central bank to prevent them from keeping reserves above statutory 
limits; (ii) consolidating institutions that are favourable to interbank lending and (iii) improving 
infrastructure to prevent remote bank branches from holding excess reserves essentially due to 
transportation problems. Second, involuntary keeping of surplus cash can be kept at minimum 
by: (i) reducing the incapacity of banks to lend in scenarios where interest rates are regulated, (ii) 
creating conducive conditions for commercial banks to invest surplus liquidity in bond markets; 
(iii) increasing investment avenues for regional banks via promotion of regional stock exchange 
markets and (iv) reducing lending contraction of banks through instruments that encourage 
competition and mitigate information asymmetry. This line of inquiry is closest to the last point 
of the first strand.  
Over the past decade, information sharing bureaus have been introduced across the 
African continent in order to enhance financial access by limiting information asymmetry. 
Unfortunately, recent empirical literature has been based on the assumption that information 
sharing agencies may not be increasing financial access as theoretically anticipated (see Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014). For instance, Asongu et al. (2016) have concluded that the effects of information 
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sharing bureaus have been negative for the most part on financial development dynamics of 
depth, allocation efficiency and activity. Moreover, as we shall demonstrate in the literature 
review which follows, there has been very limited scholarly focus on the role of information 
sharing agencies on financial access in the African continent. 
This study addresses highlighted gaps by investigating whether increasing information 
sharing bureaus could enhance financial access when it matters. The interest in considering 
initial levels of financial development arises because the findings of Asongu et al (2016) have 
been based on the average values of financial development. It is important to show countries 
with low, intermediate and high levels of financial development in the modelling exercise 
because blanket policies based on the mean values of the financial access may not succeed unless 
they are contingent on initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across 
countries with high, intermediate and low initial levels of financial access (see Henderson et al., 
2013). In the light of the above insights, the Quantile regression empirical strategy is adopted 
because existing studies on  information sharing have examined the relationship between 
information sharing bureaus and financial development by involving parameter estimates at the 
conditional mean of financial development variables (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 
2016). 
The emphasized research gaps are addressed by answering the following question: how 
does increasing information sharing bureaus affect financial access when its existing level 
matters in Africa? It is important to address this research inquiry because the findings should 
inform policy makers on how financial access barriers can be lifted to enable households and 
small corporations to maximise their savings and earnings for more productivity, more 
employment and higher economic growth. Hence, the contribution of this study is to complement 
existing literature by investigating how increases in information sharing offices influence 
financial development when existing levels are considered in the modelling exercise. One of the 
main results stemming from the econometric analysis is that increasing public credit registries 
improves financial efficiency in the middle of the financial development distribution. This result 
is intuitive because for poorly developed financial systems, increasing information sharing 
bureaus may in some respect decrease the pace of development, whereas for more developed 
financial systems, the impact of information sharing may already have been taken into account.  
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background, 
theoretical underpinnings and empirical literature. The data and methodology are covered in 
Section 3.  The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
with future research directions.  
  
2. Background, Theoretical Underpinnings and Empirical Literature  
2.1 Background  
 Information sharing bureaus or credit reference agencies (private credit bureaus and/or 
public credit registries) are institutions that collect information on the obligations of commercial 
and individual borrowers from various sources, namely: direct investigation and public sources 
(for businesses),  banks  and credit card companies (for individuals) and retail lenders 
(Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). Once the data is collected, the information is consolidated after 
cross-checking for a comprehensive credit report. Such a report is useful for potential creditors. 
Data from a credit history report can encompass both positive and negative information: (i) 
positive information (entailing details on all opened and closed credits and repayment behaviour) 
and (ii) negative information (which is default data for the most part).  
 Information sharing bureaus are essential to enhance financial access in any economy 
because they enable the mitigation of information asymmetry that restricts lenders from offering 
credits. On the one hand, adverse selection issues are attenuated with information from credit 
histories. On the other, moral hazard issues are also controlled by limiting default rates and 
increasing repayment rates. Ultimately, the incremental volume in lending is essential for sectors 
with limited financial access like micro, small and medium corporations.  
 Prior to 2008, information sharing bureaus were confined to a few countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Latin America (see Mylenko, 
2008). However, the growth of information and communication technology has considerably 
increased the presence of such information credit offices in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa 
and the Middle and Eastern Europe. In Sub-Saharan, with the exception of South Africa, very 
few countries possessed well functioning information sharing bureaus before 2008. Some nations 
like Mozambique, Nigeria and Rwanda have instituted credit offices with the prime objective of 
boosting banking sector supervision. Greater articulation is made on higher lending rates and due 
to lack of appropriate technology and incentives, such credit offices did not provide timely and 
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accurate information most of the time. Before 2008, numerous initiatives were implemented 
throughout Africa in order to institute private credit bureaus given demands for data by 
supervisors to consolidate risk management practices on the one hand and on the other from 
financial institutions. In response, many countries introduced information sharing bureaus, 
namely: Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.   
 
2.2 Theoretical highlights  
 As documented by Claus and Grimes (2003), two principal strands exist in the literature 
on theoretical underpinnings for a linkage between financial intermediaries and information 
sharing. The first strand shows liquidity provision by financial institutions while the second 
focuses on the capacity of financial intermediaries to modify the risk characteristics of assets. 
Both strands are founded on the essential economic role of financial intermediation which is to 
augment efficiency in allocation by reducing the cost of conveying mobilised deposits from 
depositors to borrowers. The theories underlying the mission of financial intermediation are 
based on the literature of imperfect information in the market. Accordingly, the primary task of 
financial intermediation is to reduce transaction and information costs arising from information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Therefore, the establishment of information sharing 
bureaus is a channel through which the reduction of information can be consolidated. The 
underpinnings are consistent with pioneering literature on the relevance of information sharing in 
financial intermediary efficiency, notably, on: models of credit rationing (see Williamson, 1986; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Jaffee & Russell, 1976), ex-post and ex-ante information asymmetry 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), communication on potential borrowers to investors by banks 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977) and diversification with financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984).  
 The association between information sharing bureaus and financial access can be seen 
from the view of adverse selection (from lenders) on the one hand and the perspective of moral 
hazard (from borrowers) on the other. Information sharing agencies provide lenders of financial 
institutions with borrower information and credit histories which enable the reduction of 
substantial interest rates that were previously the consequence of adverse selection on the part of 
financial institutions. When borrowers are granted credit, they automatically become liable to 
moral hazard because their economic activities related to granted credit could be concealed in 
order to reduce compliance with their financial obligations towards the bank or lender. It is 
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therefore the responsibility of credit bureaus to discipline borrowers on the severe consequences 
of not complying with their periodic financial obligations. It is within this framework that 
information sharing bureaus reduce moral hazard in borrowers, essentially by educating them on 
the perils of debt defaults and resorting to the informal financial sector as a sustainable 
alternative to the formal banking sector.  
 
2.3 Empirical literature  
A considerable bulk of empirical studies on information sharing has been oriented 
towards the impact of creditors’ rights to more data on the one hand and the impact of reducing 
information asymmetry among creditors on the other. The former orientation has for the most 
part focused on the influence that stronger creditors’ rights have on, inter alia:  capital structure 
(El Ghoul et al., 2012); bankruptcy (Cleassens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2011) and more 
risk-taking by financial institutions (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011). This last 
orientation has revolved around investigating how sharing information consolidates credit 
availability (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), mitigates rates of 
default (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), reduces credit cost (Brown et al., 2009 ), affects syndicated 
bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010), impacts antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 
2012) and affects corrupt-lending (Barth et al., 2009).  
It is apparent from the above literature that inquiries have for the most part been 
dedicated to  developed countries which have comparatively less severe barriers to financial 
access. Accordingly, while a substantial body of studies has been oriented toward the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation countries on the one hand and on the other, emerging 
nations in Asia and Latin America, very little scholarly work has been devoted to Africa: a 
continent with substantially higher constraints to financial access (Asongu et al., 2017).  
Macroeconomic evidence on the influence of reducing information asymmetry has been 
investigated by Galindo and Miller (2001) who  concluded that developed countries with credit 
registries are associated with lower levels of financial restrictions in comparison to their less 
developed counterparts with credit bureaus. Specifically, public credit registries that are 
performing well contribute considerably to reducing the sensitivity of decisions in investment for 
‘cash flow availability’;  a characteristic proxy for financial constraint.  
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A combination of private credit bureaus and public credit offices were employed by Love 
and Mylenko (2000) with firm-based data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey. 
They  investigated whether financial access constraints are negatively related to credit registries. 
The findings show that private credit bureaus are linked to higher financial access whereas 
public credit registries have no significant impact on decreasing constraints in financial access.    
Barth et al (2009) have investigated the effect of (i) information sharing and (ii) borrower 
and lender competition on ‘lending corruption’ through information sharing bureaus using the 
World Bank Business Environment Survey from fifty-six nations. The data set consisted of 4000 
corporations and private credit in one hundred and twenty-nine nations. Two main findings are 
established. First, corrupt-lending is reduced by competition in banking and reducing 
information asymmetry. Second, competition among firms and the legal environment have had 
considerable effect on corrupt-lending.  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) have investigated two principal issues, namely (i) the impact of 
information sharing bureaus on corporations’ access to finance and (ii) the effect of public credit 
registries’ design on the rate of constraint on financial access. The following key findings are 
apparent. First, access to finance is comparatively greater in countries with higher private credit 
bureaus relative to countries with public credit registries or no information sharing office. 
Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in financial access and on the design of information 
sharing bureaus with public credit agencies.  
Information sharing thresholds have been investigated by Asongu et al (2016). It was 
established that information sharing bureaus have negative effects on financial depth, with the 
impact from public credit registries comparatively more noticeable. Private credit bureaus have a 
higher negative impact on banking system efficiency whereas public credit registries have an 
insignificant effect. Information sharing bureaus have negative effects on financial activity, with 
the impact from public credit registries being comparatively higher. The positive influence of 
private credit bureaus on financial size is comparatively low.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 As has been said, this study examines a panel of 53 African countries with data for the 
period 2004-2011 from World Development Indicators and Financial Development and Structure 
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Database of the World Bank. The periodicity is constrained by data availability. Consistent with 
Asongu et al. (2013), four financial development variables are used, namely: depth, efficiency, 
activity and size. First, financial depth embodies (i) overall-economic depth (M2/GDP)
1
 
representing the monetary base plus demand, savings and time deposits and (ii) financial system 
deposits (Fdgdp). Distinguishing these two measurements is important because a substantial bulk 
of the monetary base in developing nations does not circulate within the formal banking sector. 
Second, financial allocation efficiency measures the ability of financial intermediaries to 
transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic agents. Two measurements of efficiency 
are used, namely (i) banking-system-efficiency (with bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’) and  
(ii) financial-system-efficiency (‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’). 
Third, financial activity is measured as the ability of financial institutions to provide credit to 
economic agents. Two indicators are also used for this dimension of financial development, 
namely (i) banking system activity (with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb’) and 
(ii) financial system activity (with ‘private credit by domestic banks and other financial 
institutions: Pcrbof”). Fourth, financial size is the as the ratio of ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total 
assets’ (‘deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets’: Dbacba).  It is 
important to note that financial ratios which are dependent variables are mostly dimensions 
identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank.   
 Consistent with recent information asymmetry literature, information sharing bureaus are 
measured with public credit bureaus and private credit registries (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu 
et al., 2016). Asongu et al. (2016) have documented six distinguishing characteristics between 
public credit bureaus and private credit registries, notably: purpose, coverage, status, ownership, 
data sources used and access. First, whereas private credit registries are made-up of public 
institutions that are constituted within the framework of supervising the banking sector, public 
credit bureaus are created in response to the need of and demand for information on borrowers in 
the banking market. Hence, data from private credit registries, usually employed to examine the 
credit-worthiness of clients, could also be acknowledged as a collateral benefit or by-product of 
private credit registries. Second, while the coverage engendered by private credit registries is 
restricted in terms of information (or data) type and history provided, public credit bureaus 
extend beyond the scope of large corporations and include small and medium size enterprises 
                                                          
1
 M2  equals Money Supply.  
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(SMEs) that are characterised with richer data and longer histories. Third, whereas public credit 
bureaus are fundamentally focused on profit-making, private credit registries are not primarily 
established for profit-making. Fourth, on the issue of ownership, whereas private credit registries 
belong to governments and/or central banks, the ownership of public credit bureaus revolve 
outside highlighted establishments (central banks and governments) to include lenders, lenders’ 
associates and independent third parties. Fifth, while the data used by private credit registries is 
sourced from non-bank and bank financial establishments, data from public credit bureaus 
entails: private credit registries, tax authorities, courts and utilities to sources employed by 
private credit registries for information. Sixth, access to private credit registries (public credit 
bureaus) is restricted to providers of information (open to all lender types).  
The control variables are also consistent with the recent information asymmetry literature 
(Asongu et al., 2016), namely: inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade and foreign aid. 
The selected covariates have also been substantially documented in the financial development 
literature (Osabuohein et al., 2013; Huang, 2005; Asongu, 2014b).  
First, foreign aid like remittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Efobi et al., 2014) could 
increase financial development if it is not associated with activities that decrease their flow 
within a country such as funds captured by developed countries for consultancy services and 
deposited by corrupt officials from developing countries in tax havens that are under the 
jurisdictions of developed countries.   
 Second, there is an abundant supply of literature which has established a positive growth-
finance relationship (see Saint-Paul, 1992; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Owosu & Odhiambo, 
2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015ab).  According to them, economic growth is linked to 
decreasing cost in financial intermediation which is the outcome of higher compensation that 
entails growing financial resources that are devoted for the purpose of investment. Moreover, the 
importance of income levels in financial development has been established in both broad 
(Levine, 1997) and African-specific (Asongu, 2012) studies. Whereas Asongu has shown that 
countries with high income are linked to greater financial development levels in Africa, it has 
been concluded by Jaffee and Levonian (2001) that higher income countries are associated with 
more developed banking system structures. It is important to balance the engaged narrative with 
the fact that growth may be linked to financial crises that ultimately reduce financial 
development (Asongu, 2016).  
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 Third, there is a branch of the literature sympathetic to the perspective that policies which 
are friendly to openness (like trade) are positively linked to financial development (see Huang & 
Temple, 2005; Do & Levchenko, 2004).  
Fourth, the nexus between investment and financial development has been assessed by 
Huang (2011) who found a positive connection.  
Fifth, some main domestic macroeconomic policies, such as the keeping of inflation 
levels stable/low are needed for financial development (Huang, 2011; Boyd et al., 2001; 
Huybens & Smith, 1999). Accordingly, Huybens and Smith (1999) and Boyd et al. (2001) have 
respectively shown theoretically and empirically that nations with chaotic/high inflations are 
very likely to be associated with smaller, less efficient and less active financial institutions.  
 It is important to note that the expected signs of covariates cannot be established without 
uncertainty because the corresponding financial development variables are conflicting by 
definition and measurement. For example, financial efficiency is measured as the ratio of 
financial activity (credit) on financial depth (deposits). The definitions and sources of the 
variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in Appendix 2 and the correlation 
matrix in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 Consistent with the research question which is to assess the influence of information 
sharing offices on financial access when existing financial development levels matter, the study 
accounts for existing levels of financial development by employing a Quantile Regressions 
estimation technique which has been documented to account for initial levels in dependent 
variables (see Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017) 
when information sharing bureaus are examined throughout the conditional distributions of the 
outcome variable (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous literature on information sharing has examined the relationship between 
information sharing bureaus and financial development by engaging parameter estimates at the 
conditional mean of financial development variables (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 
2016). Whereas mean impacts are relevant, the underlying literature is extended by employing 
Quantile Regressions that distinguish existing levels of financial access. Furthermore, while  
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Ordinary Least Squares-related regressions are based on the hypothesis that financial access  
variables and  error terms are normally distributed, such an assumption of error terms that are 
normally distributed does not hold with Quantile Regressions.  
The Quantile Regressions models parameter estimates at numerous points of the 
conditional distirbution of financial access. Therefore, the technique is in conformity with the 
motivation of distinguishing nations with high, intermediate and low initial levels of financial 
development. 
The  th quantile estimator of a financial access variable is derived by solving for the 
optimization problem in Eq (1) that is shown without subscripts for simplicity and ease of 
presentation.  
   
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k
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i
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R
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)1(min
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Where  1,0 . As opposed to Ordinary Least Squares which is fundamentally based on 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with Quantile Regressions the weighted sum of 
absolute deviations are minimised. For instance the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quartiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 
respectively) are estimated by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of 
financial development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This 
formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the Ordinary Least Squares slope where 
parameters are investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of financial 
development. For the model in Eq (2), the dependent variable iy  is a financial development 
indicator while ix  contains a constant term, foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public investment 
and inflation. As specified in Eq. (2), the linearity in quantiles is appropriate under the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. This is essentially because if there is heteroscedasticity in the 
error process, then the quantiles will possess nonlinearities of different degrees.  
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4. Empirical results  
4.1 Financial development and Public Credit Registries  
Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 respectively  disclose results corresponding to financial 
depth, financial allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size. Irrespective of tables, 
the left-hand-side (LHS) presents contemporary estimation whereas the right-hand-side (RHS) 
presents non-contemporary estimations. The motivation for lagging the independent variables on 
the RHS by one year is to account for endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu et al., 
2016). The consistent variations in information sharing estimates between Ordinary Least 
Squares and Quantile Regressions (with respect to sign, significance and magnitude of 
significance) is a justification for the relevance of the problem statement, notably investigating 
the incidence of increasing information sharing offices for financial development when existing 
levels of financial development matter.  
 The findings are explained in three levels, namely, in terms of marginal effect, net effect 
and thresholds. The net effect of increasing public credit registries in the 0.10
th
 quintile on the 
LHS of Table 1 is computed with conditional and unconditional effects of public credit 
registries. Accordingly, the marginal or conditional effect (from the interaction) is 0.052 while 
the unconditional impact of public credit registries is -0.945. Hence, the corresponding net effect 
of increasing public credit registries is -0.832 ([2.155×0.052] + -0.945)
2
. Given that the 
conditional or marginal impact is positive, the correspond threshold in public credit registries at 
which the negative unconditional effect changes from negative to positive is 18.173 
(0.945/0.052). The positive threshold is feasible because it is within the public credit registries 
range (minimum to maximum) disclosed by the summary statistics (0.00 to 49.80).   
It is important to note that whereas the computation of net effects requires statistically 
significant unconditional and conditional effects, a threshold may be apparent even when only 
the conditional effect is significant.  Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2017), the notion of 
threshold is in accordance with Cummins (2000) on the minimum level/threshold in language 
proficiency before rewards are acquired in a second language. In addition, the definition of 
threshold is also supported by the critical mass theory which has been abundantly documented in 
the literature on economic development (see Roller & Waverman, 2001; Ashraf & Galor, 2013). 
A recent application of the threshold or critical mass theory based on interaction variables can be 
                                                          
2
 2.155 is the mean value of public credit registries.  
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found in Batuo (2015). Therefore, from the perspective of this study, the concept of threshold is 
not different from: (i) the minimum requirement for the reaping of positive effects (Cummins, 
2000); (ii) conditions for U-shape and inverted U-shape  (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) and (iii) critical 
mass for positive impacts (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015). 
 Two key results can be established from Table 1 on linkages between financial depth and 
public credit registries. First, in Panel A on money supply (i) there are positive thresholds in the 
10
th
 decile with corresponding negative net effects and (ii) there is a synergy effect in the 25
th
 
quartile on the LHS.  Second, in Panel B, most significant results are apparent between in the 
10
th
 decile and 50
th
 quartile with (i) both negative (positive) net effects in the 10
th
 (25
th
) decile 
(quartile) and (ii) both positive and synergy effects in the 10
th
 decile and 25
th
 quartile and 
consistent synergy impacts in the 50
th
 quartile.  
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on linkages between financial 
efficiency and public credit registries. In Panel A (on banking system efficiency) and Panel B 
(on financial system efficiency), most of the significant estimates are between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
quartiles, with positive net effects and negative thresholds that are not within range.  
The main outcome from Table 3 on linkages between financial activity and public credit 
registries is shown in Panel A (on banking system activity) and Panel B (on financial system 
activity). It is noteworthy that most of the significant estimates are between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
quartiles, with positive net effects and negative thresholds that are not within range. 
 
 
Table 1: Financial Depth and Public Credit Registries (PCR)    
             
             
 Financial Depth  
 Panel A: Overall Economic Depth (Money Supply) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  38.302*** 19.220*** 22.628*** 21.499*** 37.550*** 75.910*** 38.659*** 19.908*** 20.312*** 20.804*** 40.514*** 72.342*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
PCR 1.188** -0.945*** 0.303 1.137*** 2.119*** 3.145** 1.362** -0.014 1.398*** 1.373*** 1.845*** 2.696 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.014) (0.959) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.194) 
PCR×PCR 0.003 0.052*** 0.024*** 0.004 -0.014 -0.047 0.0009 0.013** 0.002 0.011 -0.010 -0.040 
 (0.770) (0.000) (0.000) (0.403) (0.190) (0.141) (0.935) (0.021) (0.631) (0.307) (0.401) (0.405) 
GDP growth  -0.476* -0.216 -0.610*** -0.684*** -0.527** 0.161 -0.392 -0.224 -0.432* -0.542** -0.620** 0.048 
 (0.056) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.806) (0.158) (0.457) (0.053) (0.029) (0.011) (0.961) 
Inflation -0.056*** 0.012 -0.012 -0.025 -0.049* -0.118 -0.079*** 0.011 -0.010 -0.037* -0.088*** -0.146 
 (0.002) (0.390) (0.380) (0.191) (0.051) (0.135) (0.008) (0.698) (0.603) (0.070) (0.000) (0.219) 
Public Invt.  0.222 0.030 0.366** 0.870*** 1.139*** -0.254 0.172 -0.048 0.310 0.768*** 1.019*** -0.226 
 (0.468) (0.880) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.672) (0.600) (0.845) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.780) 
Foreign Aid  -0.635*** -0.034 -0.100 -0.234*** -0.761*** -1.375 -0.653*** -0.087 -0.068 -0.243* -0.743*** -1.314 
 (0.000) (0.743) (0.256) (0.008) (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.477) (0.514) (0.068) (0.001) (0.298) 
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Trade  -0.012 -0.038 -0.016 0.042* -0.023 -0.115 -0.005 -0.037 -0.002 0.060* -0.012 -0.054 
 (0.734) (0.111) (0.482) (0.053) (0.547) (0.393) (0.891) (0.205) (0.917) (0.070) (0.746) (0.775) 
Net Effects  na -0.832 na na na na na na na na na na 
Thresholds na 18.173 Synergy na na na na 1.076 na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.222 0.054 0.072 0.146 0.211 0.233 0.223 0.047 0.068 0.145 0.200 0.224 
Fisher  27.88***      15.21***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
 Panel B: Financial System Depth (Liquid Liabilities) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  32.242*** 13.860*** 14.292*** 13.412*** 37.863*** 60.561*** 32.423*** 12.728*** 13.787*** 14.585*** 37.179*** 61.396*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.738 -0.889*** -0.203 0.394 2.083*** 2.283* 0.903 -0.758** 0.804*** 0.236 1.811** 1.938* 
 (0.166) (0.008) (0.198) (0.143) (0.001) (0.052) (0.107) (0.013) (0.000) (0.508) (0.016) (0.078) 
PCR×PCR 0.013 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.018*** -0.016 -0.033 0.011 0.046*** 0.014*** 0.041*** -0.010 -0.029 
 (0.226) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.245) (0.207) (0.383) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.536) (0.235) 
GDP growth  -0.362 -0.192 -0.443*** -0.443** -0.747** -0.497 -0.305 -0.229 -0.343* -0.374* -0.355 -0.577 
 (0.139) (0.518) (0.000) (0.014) (0.022) (0.352) (0.260) (0.486) (0.059) (0.085) (0.302) (0.282) 
Inflation -0.039** 0.023 0.002 -0.007 -0.059* -0.124* -0.055** 0.018 0.003 -0.025 -0.075** -0.172** 
 (0.014) (0.189) (0.830) (0.740) (0.068) (0.052) (0.022) (0.413) (0.817) (0.180) (0.028) (0.016) 
Public Invt.  0.315 0.105 0.513*** 0.999*** 0.966*** 0.358 0.300 0.013 0.321** 0.934*** 0.880*** 0.006 
 (0.278) (0.662) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.461) (0.350) (0.959) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.989) 
Foreign Aid  -0.690*** -0.223* -0.065 -0.219** -0.882*** -1.380* -0.705*** -0.213* -0.010 -0.281** -0.776** -1.254 
 (0.000) (0.075) (0.314) (0.029) (0.002) (0.092) (0.000) (0.084) (0.886) (0.021) (0.013) (0.108) 
Trade  -0.012 -0.031 0.003 0.054** -0.025 0.010 -0.005 -0.004 0.0003 0.063** -0.021 0.082 
 (0.710) (0.271) (0.850) (0.031) (0.617) (0.924) (0.880) (0.888) (0.985) (0.034) (0.720) (0.449) 
Net Effects  na -0.781 na na na na na -0.568 0.834 na na na 
Thresholds na 17.78 6.151 Synergy na na na 16.478 Synergy Synergy na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.231 0.049 0.060 0.127 0.200 0.246 0.228 0.041 0.055 0.124 0.195 0.238 
Fisher  20.46***      12.07***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial depth  is least. na: not 
applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
 
Table 2: Financial Efficiency and Public Credit Registries (PCR)    
             
             
 Financial Efficiency 
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  94.940*** 51.283*** 75.054*** 97.130*** 108.35*** 136.29*** 92.993*** 53.000*** 74.958*** 90.832*** 107.44*** 141.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.553*** 1.476** 2.380*** 1.695*** 1.846*** 0.219 1.798*** 1.716** 2.513*** 1.739*** 1.996** 0.406 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.813) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.748) 
PCR×PCR -0.022** -0.004 -0.033** -0.020 -0.028* -0.009 -0.026** -0.020 -0.033 -0.019 -0.031 -0.011 
 (0.038) (0.738) (0.037) (0.146) (0.072) (0.605) (0.028) (0.182) (0.062) (0.100) (0.126) (0.677) 
GDP growth  0.274 0.754** 0.089 -0.416 -0.290 0.604 0.308 1.295*** 0.544 0.097 -0.570 -0.199 
 (0.459) (0.046) (0.836) (0.825) (0.589) (0.332) (0.394) (0.000) (0.202) (0.781) (0.425) (0.811) 
Inflation -0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.00009 -0.0007*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.035* 0.022*** -0.031 -0.013* -0.032*** -0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.650) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.001) (0.091) (0.083) (0.003) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.897** -0.422 -0.364 -0.630* -0.909* -1.151*** -0.806** -0.461 -0.441 -0.593 -0.528 -1.307** 
 (0.010) (0.236) (0.422) (0.074) (0.065) (0.003) (0.015) (0.410) (0.327) (0.068) (0.258) (0.012) 
Foreign Aid  -0.531*** 0.094 -0.249 -0.334 -0.524* -1.244*** -0.442** 0.093 -0.217 -0.242 -0.487 -1.322** 
 (0.007) (0.663) (0.364) (0.120) (0.075) (0.002) (0.018) (0.759) (0.412) (0.219) (0.143) (0.012) 
Trade  -0.200*** -0.182*** -0.243*** -0.274*** -0.197*** -0.144* -0.191*** -0.227*** -0.252*** -0.229*** -0.194** -0.172 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.096) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.121) 
Net Effects 1.505 na 1.632 na 1.785 na 1.741 na na na na na 
Thresholds -70.590 na -72.121 na -65.928 na -69.153 na na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.123 0.105 0.107 0.098 0.065 0.105 0.136 0.127 0.121 0.097 0.079 0.117 
Fisher  12.30***      6.31***      
 16 
Observations  300 300 300 300 300 300 266 266 266 266 266 266 
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  118.54*** 52.173*** 80.562*** 102.34*** 115.69*** 172.58*** 116.25*** 50.204*** 76.552*** 99.911*** 109.99*** 170.07*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.725 1.690** 2.147*** 1.386*** 1.539* -0.676 0.906 1.993*** 2.359*** 1.924*** 2.018** -0.823 
 (0.248) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.053) (0.747) (0.183) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.778) 
PCR×PCR -0.006 -0.010 -0.027* -0.016 -0.023 0.003 -0.008 -0.022 -0.031* -0.024*** -0.032* 0.025 
 (0.633) (0.460) (0.072) (0.137) (0.191) (0.942) (0.553) (0.168) (0.055) (0.006) (0.076) (0.681) 
GDP growth  -0.216 0.851*** 0.125 -0.818*** -0.999 -0.838 0.053 1.543*** 0.595 0.049 -0.661 -0.684 
 (0.631) (0.005) (0.780) (0.008) (0.115) (0.464) (0.902) (0.000) (0.119) (0.849) (0.274) (0.681) 
Inflation -0.161*** -0.148*** -0.031 -0.114*** -0.172 -0.257*** -0.235** -0.150** -0.246*** -0.291*** -0.164*** -0.323*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.463) (0.003) (0.112) (0.001) (0.022) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Public Invt.  -0.976** -0.530 -0.528 -0.374 -0.838 -1.287* -0.958** -0.339 -0.418 -0.479** -0.517 -1.283 
 (0.020) (0.149) (0.223) (0.175) (0.130) (0.075) (0.023) (0.439) (0.318) (0.045) (0.317) (0.208) 
Foreign Aid  -1.116*** 0.072 -0.431* -0.556*** -0.510 -1.678* -1.045*** 0.194 -0.239 -0.445*** -0.288 -1.637 
 (0.002) (0.769) (0.092) (0.001) (0.133) (0.071) (0.004) (0.531) (0.338) (0.002) (0.357) (0.212) 
Trade  -0.315*** -0.172*** -0.261*** -0.283*** -0.231*** -0.288* -0.305*** -0.234*** -0.250*** -0.299*** -0.225*** -0.320 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.053) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.116) 
Net Effects na na 2.088 na na na na na 2.292 1.872 1.949 na 
Thresholds na na -79.518 na na na na na -76.096 -80.166 -63.062 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.127 0.094 0.114 0.105 0.054 0.099 0.126 0.114 0.117 0.100 0.060 0.094 
Fisher  8.87***      7.28***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial efficiency  is least. na: 
not applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Financial Activity and Public Credit Registries (PCR) 
             
             
 Financial Activity 
 Panel A: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  30.823*** 8.230*** 11.792*** 13.919*** 34.575*** 77.176*** 30.625*** 8.482*** 11.204*** 12.937*** 32.985*** 78.545*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.962** -0.298* 0.404** 2.059*** 2.207*** 2.246* 1.232** 0.238** 0.967*** 2.255*** 2.477*** 2.588** 
 (0.044) (0.072) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.015) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
PCR×PCR 0.008 0.026*** 0.021*** -0.011** -0.017* -0.027 0.005 0.001 0.012*** -0.010 -0.024*** -0.035 
 (0.382) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.068) (0.248) (0.636) (0.357) (0.009) (0.109) (0.003) (0.121) 
GDP growth  -0.247 -0.036 -0.162 -0.221* -0.250 -1.261** -0.160 -0.027 -0.156 -0.062 -0.153 -1.315*** 
 (0.209) (0.806) (0.317) (0.082) (0.318) (0.010) (0.463) (0.810) (0.408) (0.663) (0.407) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.057*** 0.010 -0.004 -0.017 -0.048* -0.168*** -0.079*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.018 -0.068*** -0.203*** 
 (0.001) (0.234) (0.744) (0.258) (0.050) (0.001) (0.004) (0.443) (0.754) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.225 0.156* 0.173 0.281** -0.158 -0.039 -0.249 0.090 0.191 0.141 -0.305* -0.693* 
 (0.172) (0.076) (0.289) (0.013) (0.445) (0.926) (0.154) (0.159) (0.310) (0.226) (0.053) (0.096) 
Foreign Aid  -0.691*** -0.058 -0.149* -0.171** -0.630*** -1.503** -0.686*** -0.057 -0.045 -0.129* -0.449*** -1.297** 
 (0.000) (0.380) (0.054) (0.014) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.235) (0.609) (0.095) (0.002) (0.014) 
Trade  -0.044* -0.046*** -0.035* -0.016 -0.060* -0.205*** -0.040 -0.049*** -0.042* -0.004 -0.045* -0.170** 
 (0.096) (0.000) (0.076) (0.351) (0.072) (0.009) (0.163) (0.000) (0.063) (0.821) (0.080) (0.014) 
Net Effects na -0.241 0.449 2.183 2.170 na na na 0.992 na 2.425 na 
Thresholds na 11.461 Synergy -187.181 -129.823 na na na Synergy na -103.208 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.286 0.059 0.065 0.140 0.221 0.281 0.291 0.056 0.070 0.144 0.226 0.284 
Fisher  28.97***      16.35***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
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 Panel B: Financial System Activity  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  41.611*** 7.677*** 11.309*** 13.722*** 35.390*** 78.668*** 41.452*** 7.924*** 10.568*** 13.352*** 34.324*** 79.159*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 0.570 -0.142 0.522*** 2.066*** 2.409*** 2.257 0.822 0.193 0.912*** 2.175*** 2.553*** 2.631 
 (0.316) (0.371) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.186) (0.183) (0.173) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) 
PCR×PCR 0.016 0.020*** 0.020*** -0.011*** -0.023* -0.027 0.014 0.004 0.013*** -0.007 -0.026*** -0.036 
 (0.163) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.064) (0.421) (0.324) (0.101) (0.000) (0.259) (0.008) (0.372) 
GDP growth  -0.349 -0.012 -0.125 -0.230* -0.219 -1.256** -0.258 -0.035 -0.185 -0.088 -0.177 -1.325* 
 (0.179) (0.927) (0.356) (0.055) (0.468) (0.045) (0.364) (0.812) (0.148) (0.551) (0.454) (0.087) 
Inflation -0.073*** 0.015* 0.001 -0.015 -0.046 -0.168*** -0.101*** 0.011 -0.036* -0.018 -0.068*** -0.202** 
 (0.000) (0.050) (0.877) (0.300) (0.135) (0.008) (0.003) (0.441) (0.089) (0.145) (0.001) (0.017) 
Public Invt.  -0.178 0.174** 0.233* 0.312*** -0.227 -0.080 -0.220 0.141 0.263* 0.183 -0.359* -0.567 
 (0.420) (0.037) (0.083) (0.004) (0.408) (0.885) (0.354) (0.423) (0.096) (0.163) (0.081) (0.397) 
Foreign Aid  -1.032*** -0.026 -0.049 -0.170** -0.643*** -1.506* -1.026*** -0.011 -0.020 -0.141* -0.428** -1.273 
 (0.000) (0.675) (0.451) (0.010) (0.009) (0.073) (0.000) (0.862) (0.767) (0.083) (0.020) (0.171) 
Trade  -0.105** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.018 -0.060 -0.217** -0.100** -0.048*** -0.036** -0.008 -0.054 -0.184 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.273) (0.169) (0.032) (0.023) (0.000) (0.045) (0.657) (0.102) (0.132) 
Net Effects na na 0.565 2.042 2.359 na na na 0.940 na 2.496 na 
Thresholds na 7.100 Synergy -187.181 -104.739 na na na Synergy na -98.192 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.187 0.054 0.059 0.119 0.174 0.213 0.186 0.051 0.063 0.122 0.178 0.210 
Fisher  19.41***      11.35***      
Observations  297   297   297   297   297   297 261 261 261 261 261 261 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial activity is least. 
na: not applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Financial Size and Public Credit Registries (PCR)   
             
             
 Financial Size 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  80.591*** 49.414*** 73.926*** 93.805*** 98.821*** 95.953*** 79.225*** 41.011*** 75.023*** 91.065*** 97.709*** 98.665*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.201*** 1.514 1.489*** 0.660* 0.330** 0.173 1.329*** 2.956*** 1.422*** 0.755** 0.321*** 0.142 
 (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.092) (0.027) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.008) (0.349) 
PCR×PCR -0.021*** -0.018 -0.026*** -0.010 -0.006* -0.004* -0.025*** -0.081*** -0.026*** -0.016 -0.006** -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.360) (0.002) (0.269) (0.051) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.103) (0.011) (0.284) 
GDP growth  -0.293 -0.358 -0.761*** -0.361 -0.294*** -0.002 -0.098 -0.023 -0.571* -0.246 -0.024 -0.131* 
 (0.242) (0.669) (0.006) (0.185) (0.000) (0.956) (0.700) (0.974) (0.085) (0.232) (0.684) (0.074) 
Inflation -0.087*** -0.022 -0.084*** -0.118*** -0.076*** -0.074*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0001* -0.00005* -0.0003*** 
 (0.006) (0.713) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.067) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.756*** 0.693 0.466* 0.569** 0.377*** 0.424*** 0.700*** 0.768** 0.314 0.562*** 0.302*** 0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.153) (0.083) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.109) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.844*** -0.629* -1.088*** -1.020*** -0.938*** -0.487*** -0.767*** -0.256 -0.942*** -0.968*** -0.884*** -0.417*** 
 (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.021 0.139 0.080** -0.024 -0.006 0.022** 0.029 0.136** 0.077** 0.001 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.489) (0.224) (0.026) (0.497) (0.624) (0.010) (0.358) (0.038) (0.046) (0.959) (0.715) (0.647) 
Net Effects 1.155 na 1.432 na 0.317 na 1.275 2.781 1.365 na 0.308 na 
Thresholds -57.190 na -57.269 na -55.000 -43.250 -53.160 -36.493 -54.962 na -53.500 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.271 0.120 0.208 0.203 0.210 0.121 0.239 0.122 0.186 0.190 0.177 0.097 
Fisher  22.27***      23.61***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 264 264 264 264 264 264 
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*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial size  is least. na: not 
applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
 
 
In Table 4 on the connections between financial size and public credit registries, most of 
the significant estimates are between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 quartiles, with positive net effects and 
negative thresholds that are not within range.  
Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. It is important to note 
that some of the signs may vary from one table to another because the financial development 
variables are by definition contradictory. The financial development variable of Table 2 
(financial efficiency) is the ratio of the financial development variable in Table 3 (financial 
credit) to the financial development variable in Table 1(financial deposits).  
 
 
4. 2 Financial Development and Private Credit Bureaus   
Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 respectively  disclose results corresponding to 
financial depth, financial allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size. Irrespective 
of tables, the left-hand-side (LHS) presents contemporary estimation whereas the right-hand-side 
(RHS) presents non-contemporary estimations. Contrary to the findings in Tables 1-4 on public 
credit registries, the marginal, threshold and net effects of private credit bureaus in Tables 5-8 
are not clearly apparent. In order to examine why findings corresponding to private credit 
bureaus are not significant, we assess country-specific averages of information sharing offices 
which we disclosed in Appendix 4. From these country-specific averages, it is reasonable to infer 
that the findings on private credit bureaus are not very significant because of issues in degrees of 
freedom. Hence, the concluding implications that follow are essentially based on findings 
connected to public credit registries.  
 
5. Concluding Implications, Caveats and Future Research Directions 
 The purpose of this study has been to investigate how increasing information sharing 
bureaus affect financial access. For this purpose, we have employed contemporary and non-
contemporary interactive Quantile Regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. 
Information sharing bureaus are proxied with public credit registries and private credit bureaus. 
Financial development dynamics associated with depth (at overall economic and financial 
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system levels), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking and 
financial system perspectives) and size are used. The following findings have been established. 
First, the incidence of increasing private credit bureaus is not very apparent on financial 
access probably because private credit bureaus are still to be established in many countries. 
Second, increasing public credit registries improve financial allocation efficiency and activity (or 
credit) between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 quartiles for the most part. This result is intuitive because for 
poorly developed financial systems, increasing information sharing bureaus may in some cases 
decrease the pace of development, whereas for more developed financial systems, information 
sharing may already have been taken into account.  
As a main policy implication, countries in the top (or highest levels of financial 
development) and bottom (or lowest levels of financial development) ends of the financial 
efficiency and activity distributions are unlikely to benefit from enhanced financial allocation 
efficiency owing to increasing public credit registries. While the absence of positive net effects 
in the top quantiles may be traced to diseconomies of scale in public credit registries, the absence 
of positive net impacts in bottom quantiles could be traceable to the fact that certain levels of 
financial efficiency and activity are required before the benefits of increasing public credit 
registries can be achieved in terms of increasing financial access.  
On the relationship between established findings and the literature, two angles are 
apparent. On the one hand, the findings are broadly consistent with Singh et al. (2009) who 
found that African countries with information sharing mechanisms for banks are associated with 
higher levels of financial development. The findings are also aligned with those of Galindo and 
Miller (2001) in the view that credit registries are more likely to enhance financial development 
compared to credit bureaus in less developed countries. On the other hand, our results appear not 
to be broadly in line with those of Love and Mylenko (2003) who argued that whereas the 
presence of private registries are associated with a higher share of bank lending and lower 
constraints on finance, public registries do not have a significant effect on financing constraints. 
Our results do not also align with Triki and Gajigo (2014) who concluded that private credit 
bureaus are more positively sensitive to finance access, compared to public credit registries. 
Asongu et al. (2016) found that information sharing offices  negatively affect financial access, 
for the most part while Asongu et al. (2017) concluded that financial development dynamics 
respond more positively to private credit bureaus relative to public credit registries. 
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There are three main shortcomings in the merit emphasis. First, we have not reported QR 
coefficients with which to substantiate the analysis in the study. Accordingly, we adopted a 
minimalist approach in the interpretation of estimated coefficients. The minimalist approach is 
based on the understanding that net effects are computed from corresponding significant 
estimated coefficients and policy inferences are based on net effects. The tables and regressions 
are so many, which implies that corresponding combinations of ‘tests of equality of QR 
coefficients’ substantially increase the number of tables we have to produce. Second, typically 
measurement error can be worse in panel data models. Third, while we have used lagged values 
of the regressors in order to have some bite on endogeneity. There is a more formal approach 
such as instrumentation with lagged values. This implies that the QR regressions with 
contemporaneous regressors are even more likely to be affected by simultaneity bias. We have 
maintained both contemporary and non-contemporary regressions because both are still affected 
by simultaneity bias.  
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing how the established findings 
can be improved with information and communication technologies. Moreover, investigating 
how countries at the top and bottom ends of the financial access distributions can benefit from 
increasing public credit registries is also worthwhile. A more robust quantile estimator with 
which to investigate these suggested lines of inquiry is that proposed by Canay (2011). 
Accordingly, this estimator considers country-specific heterogeneity that is ignored in the current 
analysis.  
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Table 5: Financial Depth and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
             
             
 Financial Depth  
 Panel A: Overall Economic Depth (Money Supply) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  38.016*** 19.796*** 21.722*** 23.010*** 36.259*** 36.275*** 38.973*** 20.436*** 23.215*** 22.705*** 34.242*** 54.493*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.489 0.285 0.096 0.104 0.146 2.616** 0.215 0.177 0.077 0.155 0.216 0.775 
 (0.347) (0.253) (0.602) (0.604) (0.805) (0.041) (0.658) (0.544) (0.723) (0.627) (0.691) (0.628) 
PCB×PCB -0.007 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.046* -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.019 
 (0.395) (0.717) (0.242) (0.562) (0.843) (0.055) (0.740) (0.511) (0.290) (0.796) (0.753) (0.523) 
GDP growth  -0.557** -0.153 -0.470*** -0.702*** -0.562 -0.252 -0.465 -0.206 -0.385* -0.607** -0.694** -0.548 
 (0.035) (0.556) (0.001) (0.000) (0.106) (0.590) (0.119) (0.451) (0.060) (0.013) (0.047) (0.358) 
Inflation -0.079*** 0.017 -0.001 -0.028 -0.066* -0.166*** -0.113*** 0.012 -0.011 -0.043** -0.105*** -0.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.240) (0.919) (0.140) (0.077) (0.001) (0.006) (0.503) (0.465) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Invt.  0.266 0.012 0.595*** 0.974*** 0.917*** -0.013 0.177 -0.027 0.423** 0.736*** 0.799** 0.086 
 (0.431) (0.953) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.979) (0.621) (0.905) (0.019) (0.001) (0.034) (0.898) 
Foreign Aid  -0.697*** -0.030 -0.102 -0.247*** -0.768** -0.977 -0.724*** -0.112 -0.147 -0.169 -0.678** -1.296 
 (0.000) (0.793) (0.194) (0.004) (0.011) (0.110) (0.000) (0.380) (0.119) (0.221) (0.031) (0.147) 
Trade  0.033 -0.063** -0.046** 0.026 0.064 0.526*** 0.040 -0.048 -0.037 0.050 0.140** 0.395*** 
 (0.432) (0.015) (0.014) (0.187) (0.225) (0.000) (0.362) (0.109) (0.106) (0.129) (0.014) (0.001) 
Net Effects na na na na na 2.421 na na na na na na 
Thresholds na na na na na -56.869 na na na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.111 0.099 0.094 0.115 0.094 0.229 0.115 0.099 0.085 0.105 0.096 0.215 
Fisher  9.92***      10.05***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
 Panel B: Financial System Depth (Liquid Liabilities) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  28.531*** 13.335*** 16.601*** 13.681*** 24.483*** 29.317*** 29.251*** 15.609*** 17.954*** 14.476*** 26.685*** 43.948*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCB 0.435 0.262 0.150 0.060 1.188** 1.789* 0.144 0.306 -0.051 -0.015 0.358 0.498 
 (0.337) (0.459) (0.301) (0.819) (0.013) (0.060) (0.732) (0.257) (0.778) (0.956) (0.522) (0.707) 
PCB×PCB -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.007 -0.012 -0.028 0.002 0.002 0.009*** 0.009* 0.001 -0.009 
 (0.734) (0.540) (0.066) (0.130) (0.161) (0.118) (0.704) (0.514) (0.002) (0.074) (0.861) (0.718) 
GDP growth  -0.371 -0.122 -0.366*** -0.479** -0.621** -0.082 -0.301 -0.149 -0.331* -0.339 -0.530 -0.757* 
 (0.131) (0.729) (0.008) (0.018) (0.023) (0.833) (0.280) (0.691) (0.080) (0.100) (0.131) (0.085) 
Inflation -0.050*** 0.030 0.008 -0.006 -0.041 -0.139*** -0.077** 0.025 0.001 -0.019 -0.067* -0.206*** 
 (0.004) (0.147) (0.409) (0.800) (0.166) (0.000) (0.015) (0.321) (0.897) (0.266) (0.062) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  0.329 0.111 0.532*** 1.032*** 0.984*** 0.012 0.283 0.087 0.363** 0.985*** 0.729* 0.196 
 (0.281) (0.658) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.395) (0.763) (0.033) (0.000) (0.051) (0.723) 
Foreign Aid  -0.599*** -0.213 -0.115* -0.134 -0.427* -0.899* -0.628*** -0.170 -0.058 -0.151 -0.461 -1.178* 
 (0.000) (0.147) (0.072) (0.234) (0.067) (0.051) (0.000) (0.256) (0.488) (0.188) (0.155) (0.060) 
Trade  0.034 -0.049 -0.040** 0.034 0.048 0.481*** 0.041 -0.067* -0.048** 0.036 0.071 0.410*** 
 (0.389) (0.171) (0.015) (0.192) (0.251) (0.000) (0.324) (0.073) (0.027) (0.185) (0.222) (0.000) 
Net Effects na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Thresholds na na na na na na na na 5.666 1.666 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.158 0.111 0.113 0.146 0.158 0.212 0.166 0.105 0.108 0.152 0.159 0.201 
Fisher  18.25***      20.16***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial depth  is least. na: not 
applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
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Table 6: Financial Efficiency and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)   
             
             
 Financial Efficiency 
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  88.443*** 44.574*** 80.573*** 93.307*** 98.604*** 109.59*** 87.666*** 45.151*** 76.586*** 90.431*** 102.67*** 111.74*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.741 0.808 0.612 0.748 0.847* 1.229 0.560 0.695 -0.481 0.111 0.806 0.829 
 (0.155) (0.053) (0.275) (0.123) (0.099) (0.465) (0.351) (0.201) (0.402) (0.832) (0.186) (0.563) 
PCB×PCB -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.0007 -0.004 -0.013 -0.001 -0.005 0.016 0.009 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.633) (0.194) (0.760) (0.928) (0.628) (0.638) (0.873) (0.582) (0.126) (0.342) (0.705) (0.724) 
GDP growth  0.355 0.695*** 0.591 -0.177 -0.396 0.094 0.407 1.104*** 0.694 -0.0003 -0.396 0.353 
 (0.312) (0.002) (0.202) (0.621) (0.354) (0.927) (0.234) (0.001) (0.127) (0.999) (0.392) (0.700) 
Inflation -0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.00004 -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.035* 0.017 -0.036* -0.013 -0.033*** -0.051*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.844) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.134) (0.075) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.787** -0.349 -1.099** 0.163 -0.249 -1.021 -0.760** -0.394 -0.966** 0.101 -0.361 -1.337 
 (0.030) (0.218) (0.018) (0.601) (0.408) (0.490) (0.033) (0.314) (0.048) (0.749) (0.295) (0.140) 
Foreign Aid  -0.255 0.141 -0.430 -0.426** -0.341 0.029 -0.221 0.132 -0.113 -0.329 -0.432** -0.369 
 (0.178) (0.551) (0.128) (0.041) (0.101) (0.962) (0.220) (0.679) (0.799) (0.138) (0.045) (0.397) 
Trade  -0.165*** -0.104** -0.241***   -0.290*** -0.115** -0.041 -0.152*** -0.118* -0.238*** -0.249*** -0.130** 0.050 
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.776) (0.003) (0.089) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.646) 
Net Effects na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Thresholds na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.154 0.107 0.090 0.091 0.112 0.138 0.146 0.115 0.094 0.074 0.109 0.141 
Fisher  12.43***      5.92***      
Observations  301 301 301 301 301 301 267 267 267 267 267 267 
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  102.50*** 38.143*** 82.274*** 104.06*** 112.69*** 127.76*** 100.61*** 40.685*** 77.337*** 101.21*** 109.93*** 114.81*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB -0.047 1.317*** 0.665 0.142 0.179 -2.391*** -0.628 1.024* 0.106 0.072 -0.311 -2.035** 
 (0.949) (0.000) (0.216) (0.699) (0.753) (0.000) (0.421) (0.052) (0.866) (0.686) (0.558) (0.012) 
PCB×PCB 0.023 -0.017*** -0.003 0.015** 0.035*** 0.094*** 0.034** -0.011 0.005 0.016** 0.044*** 0.086*** 
 (0.122) (0.002) (0.718) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.204) (0.655) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.079 1.002*** 0.710 -0.594** -0.928 -0.142 0.392 1.403*** 0.927* -0.069 -0.733 0.163 
 (0.851) (0.000) (0.123) (0.029) (0.100) (0.921) (0.341) (0.000) (0.062) (0.826) (0.136) (0.885) 
Inflation -0.136** 0.006 -0.251*** -0.103*** -0.161* -0.130 -0.220* -0.133*** -0.430*** -0.393*** -0.172*** -0.191** 
 (0.027) (0.781) (0.000) (0.002) (0.099) (0.165) (0.071) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) 
Public Invt.  -0.934** -0.149 -1.189*** 0.010 -0.057 -0.934 -0.968** -0.235 -0.953* -0.026 -0.270 -0.789 
 (0.033) (0.561) (0.007) (0.967) (0.906) (0.617) (0.031) (0.503) (0.082) (0.925) (0.395) (0.372) 
Foreign Aid  -0.411* 0.265 -0.384 -0.545*** -0.351 -0.355 -0.389* 0.276 -0.283 -0.396** -0.336 -0.129 
 (0.063) (0.194) (0.166) (0.001) (0.234) (0.650) (0.064) (0.379) (0.392) (0.031) (0.204) (0.856) 
Trade  -0.274*** -0.099*** -0.248*** -0.343*** -0.267*** -0.198 -0.255*** -0.115* -0.202** -0.312*** -0.216*** -0.114 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.092) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.492) 
Net Effects na 1.245 na na na -1.994 na na na na na -1.671 
Thresholds na -195.117 na Synergy Synergy 25.436 18.470 na na Synergy 7.068 23.662 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.346 0.105 0.089 0.114 0.207 0.374 0.365 0.107 0.095 0.104 0.219 0.399 
Fisher  7.55***      6.60***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial efficiency  is least. na: 
not applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
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Table 7: Financial Activity and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)   
             
             
 Financial Activity 
 Panel A: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  25.192*** 7.428*** 12.450*** 17.646*** 25.475*** 27.240*** 25.625*** 8.163*** 11.685*** 17.506*** 26.786*** 30.470*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
PCB 0.367 0.531*** 0.363** -0.028 1.619*** 1.501** 0.073 0.595*** 0.256 -0.151 0.637* 1.123 
 (0.368) (0.000) (0.018) (0.919) (0.000) (0.048) (0.853) (0.000) (0.154) (0.558) (0.032) (0.204) 
PCB×PCB 0.001 -0.003** -0.0004 0.010** -0.015*** -0.017 0.006 -0.004*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.002 -0.010 
 (0.859) (0.014) (0.858) (0.039) (0.006) (0.239) (0.330) (0.001) (0.551) (0.006) (0.686) (0.485) 
GDP growth  -0.211 -0.024 -0.146 -0.301 -0.583*** -1.163*** -0.106 -0.046 -0.049 -0.167 -0.357* -1.283*** 
 (0.266) (0.835) (0.179) (0.151) (0.005) (0.001) (0.633) (0.708) (0.805) (0.378) (0.057) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.066*** 0.010 -0.005 -0.024 -0.048** -0.156*** -0.101** -0.001 -0.072*** -0.027* -0.072*** -0.195*** 
 (0.002) (0.162) (0.612) (0.345) (0.028) (0.000) (0.025) (0.897) (0.004) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.193 0.152** 0.037 0.284 0.260 -0.057 -0.250 0.093 0.107 0.084 -0.010 -0.141 
 (0.318) (0.027) (0.706) (0.122) (0.170) (0.887) (0.227) (0.222) (0.543) (0.618) (0.953) (0.786) 
Foreign Aid  -0.510*** -0.026 -0.103 -0.114 -0.336** -0.684 -0.528*** -0.047 -0.088 -0.063 -0.343** -0.721 
 (0.000) (0.643) (0.108) (0.337) (0.039) (0.133) (0.000) (0.380) (0.304) (0.545) (0.032) (0.204) 
Trade  0.007 -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.050* -0.005 0.361*** 0.014 -0.041*** -0.029 -0.039 0.011 0.374*** 
 (0.830) (0.000) (0.009) (0.068) (0.850) (0.000) (0.682) (0.000) (0.166) (0.121) (0.708) (0.000) 
Net Effects na 0.518 na na 1.555 na na 0.578 na na na na 
Thresholds na -177.000 na 2.800 -107.933 na na -148.750 na -12.583 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.239 0.136 0.113 0.130 0.193 0.275 0.245 0.136 0.108 0.131 0.193 0.279 
Fisher  12.67***      12.30***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  30.696*** 7.516*** 11.177*** 16.807*** 23.312*** 30.262*** 30.778*** 7.726*** 9.975*** 16.269*** 25.055*** 31.868*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB -0.144 0.550*** 0.426*** -0.103 0.863*** 1.963*** -0.690 0.615*** 0.287* -0.147 0.462 1.636*** 
 (0.798) (0.000) (0.004) (0.676) (0.007) (0.000) (0.211) (0.000) (0.058) (0.569) (0.160) (0.001) 
PCB×PCB 0.018* -0.004** -0.002 0.011*** 0.012** -0.002 0.029*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.003 
 (0.097) (0.026) (0.431) (0.009) (0.028) (0.810) (0.009) (0.004) (0.672) (0.006) (0.000) (0.642) 
GDP growth  -0.194   -0.052 -0.155 -0.324* -0.633*** -0.848** -0.069 -0.043 -0.052 -0.190 -0.416* -0.824** 
 (0.393) (0.677) (0.171) (0.058) (0.003) (0.021) (0.796) (0.816) (0.750) (0.317) (0.065) (0.046) 
Inflation -0.067*** 0.012 -0.002 -0.022 -0.042* -0.149*** -0.107** -0.021* -0.084*** -0.024 -0.069*** -0.178*** 
 (0.003) (0.141) (0.844) (0.330) (0.052) (0.001) (0.031) (0.081) (0.000) (0.122) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.183 0.165** 0.161 0.269 0.453** -0.278 -0.251 0.103 0.208 0.215 0.088 -0.373 
 (0.403) (0.035) (0.210) (0.104) (0.025) (0.522) (0.291) (0.232) (0.153) (0.204) (0.671) (0.461) 
Foreign Aid  -0.617*** -0.020 -0.041 -0.052 -0.265 -0.695 -0.636*** -0.010 -0.024 -0.022 -0.263 -0.689 
 (0.000) (0.753) (0.524) (0.623) (0.121) (0.155) (0.000) (0.861) (0.728) (0.829) (0.116) (0.189) 
Trade  -0.048 -0.048*** -0.038** -0.046* -0.007 0.346*** -0.036 -0.040*** -0.019 -0.037 0.014 0.348*** 
 (0.211) (0.000) (0.012) (0.063) (0.821) (0.000) (0.371) (0.001) (0.251) (0.146) (0.673) (0.000) 
Net Effects na 0.533 na na 0.913 na na 0.593 na na na na 
Thresholds 8.000 -137.500 na 9.363 Synergy na 23.793 -123.000 na 12.250 Synergy na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.347 0.117 0.098 0.111 0.196 0.388 0.377 0.117 0.094 0.110 0.210 0.394 
Fisher  7.46***      7.14***      
Observations  298 298 298 298 298 298 262 262 262 262 262 262 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial activity is least. na: not 
applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
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Table 8: Financial Size and Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)   
             
             
 Financial Size 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  78.027*** 52.663*** 74.301*** 84.765*** 96.725*** 98.146*** 76.926*** 44.224*** 71.822*** 85.454*** 96.035*** 98.959*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.592*** 1.196*** 0.565** 0.354* 0.144 0.010 0.537*** 1.182*** 0.540 0.310 0.134 0.024 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.046) (0.082) (0.288) (0.879) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.152) (0.345) (0.705) 
PCB×PCB -0.005*** -0.010* -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.0005 -0.004** -0.0089** -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.094) (0.414) (0.369) (0.589) (0.630) (0.011) (0.014) (0.579) (0.510) (0.601) (0.908) 
GDP growth  -0.249 -0.259 -0.739*** -0.220 -0.216*** 0.051 -0.031 0.042 -0.341 0.060 -0.024 0.033 
 (0.337) (0.606) (0.009) (0.167) (0.004) (0.323) (0.908) (0.948) (0.300) (0.706) (0.763) (0.482) 
Inflation -0.094*** -0.011 -0.084*** -0.108*** -0.070*** -0.072*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.008) (0.718) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.881*** 0.924*** 0.518** 0.666*** 0.370*** 0.102 0.770*** 0.760** 0.444** 0.540*** 0.204** 0.034 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.015) (0.019) (0.000) (0.014) (0.642) 
Foreign Aid  -0.736*** -0.766*** -1.103*** -0.738*** -0.834*** -0.423*** -0.666*** -0.289* -0.870*** -0.780*** -0.668*** -0.364*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.035 0.067 0.075** 0.035* 0.002 0.011 0.044 0.114** 0.081** 0.025 0.009 0.004 
 (0.245) (0.282) (0.017) (0.081) (0.851) (0.261) (0.152) (0.028) (0.029) (0.224) (0.486) (0.648) 
Net Effects 0.570 1.153 na na na na 0.520 1.148 na na na na 
Thresholds -118.400 -119.600 na na na na -134.250 -147.750 na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.289 0.175 0.230 0.224 0.209 0.123 0.249 0.163 0.207 0.204 0.176 0.102 
Fisher  61.62***      65.49***      
Observations  297 297 297 297 297 297 265 265 265 265 265 265 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower  quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial size is least. na: not 
applicable because corresponding estimates needed for computation are not significant.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399   
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. GDPg: GDP 
growth.  
.  
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        Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size: 291) 
           
Financial Development Dynamics     
    Info. Asymmetry Other variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size        
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.970 0.094 0.103 0.821 0.629 0.398 0.416 0.147 -0.104 -0.080 0.055 -0.295 0.140 M2 
 1.000 0.130 0.220 0.886 0.754 0.452 0.409 0.303 -0.091 -0.063 0.070 -0.320 0.149 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.243 0.154 0.303 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.583 0.743 0.242 0.067 0.510 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 FcFd 
    1.000 0.922 0.478 0.448 0.439 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.413 0.293 0.556 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.249 0.343 -0.061 -0.142 0.198 -0.403 0.210 Dbacba 
       1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
        1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
         1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
          1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
           1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
            1.000 -0.309 NODA 
             1.000 Trade 
               
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  
          Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit 
          Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information.  
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Appendix 3: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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Appendix 4: Country-specific Average Values from Information Sharing Bureaus   
   
 Public Credit Registries  Private Credit Bureaus 
   
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 
9) Central African Republic  1.412 0.000 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 
14) Côte d’Ivoire  2.487 0.000 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 
19) Ethiopia  0.087 0.000 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 
28) Libya na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 
33) Mauritius  27.866 0.000 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 
44) Somalia na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 
49) Togo 2.550 0.000 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 
   
na: not applicable because of missing observations.  
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